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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

)

Respondent,
vs.

)

DAVID WAYNE BANFORD,

Case No.
9395

)

Defendant and Appellant,)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant and four others were arrested on the 16th day
of December, 1959, (R. 4, 5 ); a warrant for their arrest
was issued pursuant to a complaint filed on the 18th of
December (R. 2, 3, 5) and charging the second degree
burglary of a service station.

Defendants waived prelimi-

nary hearing on December 18 (R. 1, 2, 5 } and were bound
over to the District Court on December 21 or before on the
charge of second degree burglary (R. 5 ).
Appellant David Banford and two others were arraigned
on January 5, 1960 before the honorable Parley E. Nors eth
(R. 10, 24-29).

L. Roland Anderson, District Attorney for

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the Saeond Judicial District, appeared on behalf of the

State (R. 24).

He was the only lawyer appearing (R. 24 ) .

Because the arraignment was brief, and because it
is the crux of this appeal, the arraignment is set forth,
as it applied to appellant David Wayne Banford, in full.
"THE COURT:

No. 664 Criminal.

State of Utah

versus William Thomas Gary, Edwin Oscar Fillen,
Charles Edson Sherwood, David Wayne Banford and
Dennis Austin.

This is the time set for arraignment.

All of you come up, please (R. 24).
"THE COURT:

The record will show this is the

time set for the arraignment of Edwin Oscar Fillen,
David Wayne Banford and Dennis Austin.
read the Information.

You may

Each of them have a copy, do

they not, Mr. Anderson?
MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

Yes.

The record will show each of them

received a copy of the Information.
(Information read by Clerk of the Court.)" (R. 25)
"(The Court) Mr.

~avid

Wayne Banford, if you

are not designated in this Information by your true and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

correct name, you may declare your true name now,

or be prosecuted under the name of David Wayne
Banford.
MR. BANFORD:
THE COURT:

That's my name.

The Court informs you that you are

entitled to be represented by an attorney, and need
take no affirmative steps until you have counsel.

Is

it your desire to have an attorney?
MR. BANFORD:
THE COURT:

No sir.

Do you waive services of an

attorney in open court?
MR. BANFORD:
THE COURT:

Yes s1r.

The Court advises you that you may

have and take at least 48 hours before you are required to plead to the Information charging you with
burglary in the second degree, or you may waive that
time and enter your plea now.
MR . BANFORD:
THE COURT:

I waive it.

The record will so show.

To the Information charging you with bu·rglary in
the second degree, what is your plea?
guilty?

Guilty or not

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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MR. BANFORD:
THE COURT:

Guilty, s1r.

The record will show the defendant

enters a plea of guilty, and upon such plea the Court
adjudicates him guilty of the offense charged." (R. 26-27)
THE COURT:

I will refer it to the Adult Probation

Department for investigation and report.

And that

means you three are to report to one of the probation
officers in Ogden, Utah, today.
MR. ANDERSON:

This one man is incarcerated,

Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Then they can contact the man that

1s in jail down here.

(Discussion off the record.)
THE COURT:

Now I want to warn all of you that

if you lie to Mr. Larsen, we'll know about it.

If I

find out that any one of you lied, you won't get any
kind of probation consideration.

I want to warn you

now that I'm not granting you probation.
whether I '11 give you probation or not.

I 4on't know
You have

acted like a bunch of blamed fools.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(Further statement by the Court)"(R. 28-29)
David Wayne Banford appeared before the honorable
John F. Wahlquist for sentencing on January 19 (R. 12 ).
He was not represented by counsel (R. 19), nor accompanied by counsel.

(R. 7) stating that he was "accom-

panied by his attorney," was reformed on appellant's
motion by the honorable John F. Wahlquist to read
"without an attorney. "(R.14-16) David Wayne Banford
was sentenced to serve an indeterminate term in the
Utah State Penitentiary for second degree burglary
(R. 7, 12, 19-22).

The honorable John F. Wahlquist

apparently felt that David Banford should serve the
minimum one year sentence (R. 22).
While the record does not disclose David Banford's
age, the record does show that David is a minor, since
the honorable John F. Wahlquist considered the question of whether to commit David to the State Industrial
School (R . 2 1 ) .
David Banford arrived at the Utah State Penitentiary on January 19, 1961 (R. 6-A).

He filed a notice
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of appeal on February 19 (R. 8-9 ).
One last point causes counsel for the appellant some
concern.

On the one hand, this Court has established

that it does not desire to hear recitations of fact not
supported by the record.

On the other hand, many

appellate courts faced with pleas of guilty have felt
that an important consideration was whether the defendant was guilty.

Counsel for the appellant are not

aware of whether they should inform the court of
matters outside the record.

However, may we submit

to this court that the defendant's plea of guilty is not
conclusive proof that he is guilty.
There is an unfortunate belief that if a man pleads
guilty, he is guilty.

This common presumption does

not always meet the test of common sense.

A defen-

dant may feel that unless he hires the most expensive
lawyer he is merely postponing the inevitable.

He

may feel it is better to plead guilty and accept a
criminal record and hope for probation, or a few
months in jail, rather than place himself and his
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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family in debt to a lawyer.

He may share the common

belief that courts are "easier" on the defendant who
pleads guilty.

He may have been persuaded by the

traditionally strong statements of police officers about
how strong the State's case is.

He may be a minor

and unable to view the massive and overwhelming
machinery of justice with a clear, mature view -- he
just hasn't finished growing up.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING
APPELLANT'S PLEA OF GUILTY AND ENTERING
JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE THEREON FOR THE
REASON THAT THE TRIAL COURT LOST ITS
JURISDICTION OVER THE PROCESS.
Counsel contends that David Banford did not
receive that fundamental respect, that degree of
fairness, which due process of law, both state and
federal, require.

Counsel offers five reasons for

that conclusion.
Before discussing the five reasons, counsel
desires to discuss certain underlying questions of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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law:

Those points which West Publishing Company

traditionally headnotes under "Appeal and Error",
those points which a court reviews in determining
what question is before it and what ruling may reasonably be made.

First, the defendant can only present

errors which are jurisdictional.

He pled guilty and

therefore waived all other errors, although this court
has the power to determine that some happening was
prejudicial error, even though not jurisdictional
error.

Second, since the errors are jurisdictional,

they need not be preserved for appeal.

Rather it is

the trial court's (or the State's) duty to preserve a
record showing that the trial court retained jurisdiction.

Third, the want of juris diction in a criminal

case may be raised for the first time in the Supreme
Court.
1.

"The plea of guilty waives and defect not

jurisdictional."

4 Wharton's Criminal Law and

s
Procedure, s 1901 (p. 770) (1957 ed. ); People v.

Popescue, 345 Ill. 142, 177 N.E. 739, 77 A.L.R.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1199.

Therefore,

appellant is not concerned with

whether the error of the trial court was prejudicial,
nor with whether the trial judge abused his discretion.
He has no right to raise such issues.

On the other

hand, if the trial court lost jurisdiction, the question
does not arise whether the action was prejudicial.
The trial court lost jurisdiction over the process, or,
as some put it, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction.
The process is therefore void.

(Putting it another way,

if the trial court didn't have jurisdiction to put David
Banford in the State Penitentiary, then putting him
in the State Penitentiary was prejudicial.)
The cases cited in this brief are almost exclusively cases wherein the accused pled guilty.

It

follows that the cases are ones wherein the court was
concerned with jurisdiction.

In those cases wherein

a new trial was granted, the appellate court necessarily found that the trial court lost jurisdiction over
the process. Ore question before this court is whether
errors which are jurisdictional in other states are
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services

Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
jurisdictional in Library
Utah.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2.

Utah authority seems to support the proposition

that if a trial judge fails to preserve sufficient record
to show that he retained jurisdiction, then the Supreme
Court will rule that he lost it.

The trial judge faces

no particular difficulty in preserving a record showing
jurisdiction if, in fact, he had jurisdiction.

On the

other hand, placing upon a defendant not represented
by a lawyer the duty to preserve a record showing

that the trial judge did exceed his jurisdiction is placing
upon a defendant an impossible burden.
At least one function of the writ of certiorari in the
State of Utah appears to be to give th.e Supreme Court an
opportunity to review the record to see if the trial
court has jurisdiction.

Hillyard v. District Ct. of

Cache County, 68 Utah 220, 249 Pac. 806 (1926).

In

that case, in which the Supreme Court found that the
trial court exceeded its jurisdiction, there is some
discussion of presumption of verity of the record on
the point of whether the trial judge was obligated to
preserve a record showing that necessary waivers
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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were made.

Apparently the Court held that the record

is conslusively presumed to contain all jurisdictional
facts that did occur.

The same rule appears to apply

in the State of Illinois, at least in criminal cases.

In

that state, the writ of error appears to have the same
function as the writ of certiorari in the State of Utah.
Two cases from Illinois, relevant here, concern the
need to amend the trial record in order to show that
the jurisdictional acts did or did not occur.

Both

cases are concerned with the need to admonish a
criminal defendant of the consequences of his plea
before the plea of guilty may be accepted.

In both

cases, the Supreme Court of Illinois held, as a preliminary ruling, that the record had to disclose that
the defendant was admonished in order to show that
the trial court retained jurisdiction over the process.
Thefirst, Peoplev. Petrie, 294111.366, 128N.E.
569, concerned a record which originally did not
contain the statement that the defendant was duly admonished of the consequences of his plea.

The trial·

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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judge later amended the record.
remanded.

Held, reversed and

The amendment was not duly made.

With-

out the amendment, the record did not disclose the
jurisdictional facts nee es sary for a finding that the
court retained jurisdiction over the subject matter.
In the second, People v. Fulimon, 308 Ill. 235,
139 N. E. 396, the defendant moved to expunge from
the record the statement that the defendant was duly
admonished.
denied.

Apparently, the motion was summarily

On appeal reversed and remanded.

Without

the correction, the defendant would have no case for
review under a writ of error.
On the basis of the foregoing authorities and
reasoning, appellant submits that the presumption
of verity of the trial record requires a finding that
the trial record contains all jurisdictional facts
which did in fact occur.
apparent:

The need for the rule s eerns

a lawyer has to be able to rely upon a rule

that says fb.e record discloses what happened.
3.

The question of want of jurisdiction in the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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trial court, in a criminal case, may be raised for the
first time in the Supreme Court.
Utah 273, 64 Pac. 764.

State v. Morrey, 23

Therefore, David Banford

was not obligated to point out to the trial court at what
stage of the proceedings the trial court failed to inform
David Banford of his rights.
1.

THE COURT COULD NOT ACCEPT DAVID

BANFORD'S PLEA OF GUILTY BEFORE ADMONISHING
HIM OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA BECAUSE
HE WAS NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
"Where the defendant is not represented by
counsel, the court shall not accept a plea of guilty until
it shall have explained to the defendant the consequences

of such plea. "

s
s 7 7- 24- 6 U. C • A. ( 19 53).

Appellant submits that the history of this statute
emphasizes that a court commits jurisdictional, and
therefore reversible, error if it fails to admonish the
defendant of the consequences of his plea providing the
defendant is not accompanied by counsel.

-13-
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A.

Summary
In passing such a statute, the legislature exercised

its prerogative to establish a policy binding upon the
people and the courts.

When a man appears without a

lawyer before the bar of criminal justice, there is the
danger that he has been misinformed by overzealous
police officers or prosecutors as to what shall be the
probable consequences of his plea.

Perhaps

he was

informed, or believes though he was not informed, that
a plea of guilty will automatically give him probation
if he has not been convicted before.

He may believe

that the sentence is lower for those who plead guilty.
He may not realize that the offense is punishable by
imprisonment in the State Penitentiary.

Perhaps, if

he can prove that the plea of guilty arose from a
promise of leniency, he can have the conviction and
sentence set aside.

However, the legislature has

established that he bears no such burden of proof.
The danger that his plea of guilty will arise from an
1gnorance of the potential dangers he faces is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sufficiently great as compared with the ease with which
that danger may be avoided, that the legislature has
made a mandatory requirement:

Before the Court may

accept the plea of guilty, it must inform the defendant
who appears without a
plea.

lawye~

of the consequences of his

"Consequences" appears to mean the number

of years which he can be forced to serve in the State
Penitentiary for committing the offense.

See any of

the Illinois, Texas or Arizona decisions cited infra.
Nor should it be the defendart' s duty to establish
the prejudicial effect of the judge's action in failing to
admonish the defendant of the consequences of his
plea.

That would place upon the defendant the burden

of proof.

If he cannot prove the fact of prejudice, then

he loses regardless of whether he was in fact prejudiced
or not.

Compare, Frank,

Courts~

Trial, wherein the

honorable Jerome Frank discusses the difficulties of
actually ascertaining what has happened.
the presumption must be one of prejudice.

Therefore,
In order to

put teeth in a law which is so easily followed and whose
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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violation may have such a profound effect on a defendant's
subsequent life, that presumption must be irrebuttable.
Since the presumption is irrebuttable, the error should
be regarded as jurisdictional.

Therefore, the judgment

of guilty and the sentence entered thereon do not
constitute due process within the meaning of the law.
B.

Legislative History
The provision became part of the Utah law in 1935.

s
1935 Laws of Utah ch. 122, s 1.

It was proposed by the

Utah State Bar Association, V Utah Bar Bulletin 22-23,
as part of a general change in Utah criminal procedure.
See also IV Utah Bar Bulletin.

It was based upon the

A.L.I. Code of Criminal Procedure (1930).

(The

A.L.I. Code of Criminal Procedure (1930) is available
at the University of Utah Law Library. } The relevant
section of the A. L. I. Code is ~ 224.

As found in the

A.L.I. Code, and as proposed to the legislature, the
statute would have contained the proviso that the "failure
of the Court to explain the consequences of the plea shall
not affect the validity of any proceeding in the action. "
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The proviso presumably meant that the error could
not be raised on certiorari or habeas corpus, since
these remedies are limited to jurisdictional error.

Ex

Parte Hays, 15 Utah 77, 4 7 Pac. 612; Hillyard v. District
CourtofCacheCounty, 68 Utah220, 249 Pac. 806.
Apparently, then, a defendant would be able to raise
the issue only on appeal and then would be required to
show that the error was prejudicial.

6 Utah Zd 126, 307 P. 2d 88 7.

State v. Hines,

That proviso was

stricken before the law was adopted.

See Utah Senate

Bill #38 {1935), in the office of the Secretary of State,
State of Utah, where the provision is stricken in red.
This left the bill almost identical to the language found
in the Illinois Rev. Stat., 1929, ch. 38, ~ 756, now
Ill. Rev. Stat. {1959) Ch. 38 ~ 732, except that Illinois
requires the admonishment even when the accused is
accompanied by counsel.
"In cases where the party pleads 'guilty' such plea
shall not be entered until the court shall have fully
explained to the accused the consequences of entering
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such plea; . . . "

The statute is also almost identical,

on this point, to the language of the Texas statute.

See

Vernon's Ann. C.C.P. Art. 501:
"If the defendant plead guilty, he shall be admonished
by the court of the consequences, and no such plea shall
be received unless it plainly appear that he is sane, and
is uninfluenced by any consideration of fear, by any
persuasion or delusive hope of pardon prompting him
to confess his guilt."

(Amended in 1959 to add plea

of nolo contendere. )
These two laws are among the five on which the
American Law Institute relied in writing the proposed
provision.

A.L.I. Code of Criminal Procedure (1930)

Commentary on section 224.

They are also the two

laws that appear to be most litigated and the two laws
most similar in language.

Accordingly, the court

may desire to consider the interpretations of those
statutes by courts of last resort.
C.

The Case Law.
1.

The Supreme Court of Illinois has clearly
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stated its analysis in a 1957 case and has shown that
the violation of the statute is reversible error in
cases handed down before the Utah legislature adopted
its act.
In People v. Baxton, 10 Ill. 2d 295, 139 N.E. 2d
754 {1957) {Daily, J. ), cert. denied, 77 S. Ct. 1062,
353 U.S. 976, 1 L.ED. 2d 1138, judgment of guilty
and sentence of 99 years to a plea of guilty to a charge
of murder was affirmed.

{Defendant had beat a man

to death with a whiskey bottle.)
"The next assignments of error center around the
assertion in defendant's brief that the 'Court exceeded
its jurisdiction by accepting Plea of Guilty from
{illiterate) defendant who attempted to defend self.'
Such a theory overlooks, of course, that the court
set aside the proceedings at which defendant attempted
to defend himself and ultimately accepted the plea of
guilty entered while he was attended by counsel.

In

so doing we do not find either that the court exceeded
its jurisdiction or that it committed an abuse of
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discretion.

A strict requirement of our law is that,

in each conviction of a crime upon a plea of guilty,
the record must show that before the entry of the
plea the court fully explained its consequences to the
defendant and that the explanation was understandingly
received . ' Ill. R e v. Stat . 1 9 5 1 , c h. 3 8 , par . 7 3 2;
People v. Washington, 5 Ill. 2d 58, 124 N.E. 2d 890.
The object of the rule is to give the defendant the
right to withdraw the plea of guilty, if, after hearing
the consequences of such plea, he desires to be tried
byajury.

468.

Peoplev. Wilke3 390111.598, 62N.E. 2d

In the record before us the explanation and ad-

monition of the court, given upon two occasions, is a
model of thoroughness, and th.e defendant's replies on
both occasions demonstrate that his plea was knowingly and understandingly made and persisted in.

We

find no basis to now say that his plea should not have
been accepted. "

P. 756.

In People v. Fulimon, 308 Ill. 235, 139 N.E. 396
(1923) (Cartwright, J.), the defendant pled guilty to
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the charge of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.
In People v. Petrie, 294 Ill. 366, 128 N.E. 569 (1920)
(Dunn, J. ) , the defendant pled guilty to an indictment
charging abduction.

Both of these cases were reversed

and remanded because the Supreme Court of Illinois was
not satisfied that the defendant was duly admonished.
(The particular points of error in each of these cases
are technical:

on what notes may the trial judge rely

when he makes a minute entry saying that the defendant
was duly admonished.

At least one of the opinions

has a dissent which,

however~

nature of the error:

whether the Supreme Court of

goes to the technical

Illinois should rule that the record discloses that the
defendant was admonished.

All opinions are agreed

on the point that if the record does not show that
defendant was admonished, then he was entitled to a
new trial.)
In People v. Rusk, 348 Ill. 218, 180 N.E. 863
(1932) (Dunn, J. ), the defendant was charged with
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robbery while armed with a pistol.

The State dropped

the pistol count and the defendant pled guilty to robbery.
After being duly admonished,
guilty to robbery.

he persisted in pleading

Later in the same term, he was

allowed to withdraw his plea to robbery.

The State

dropped the robbery charge and defendant pled guilty
to a lesser included offense of grand larceny.

He

was sentenced to the state reformatory for an indeterminate sentence of one to ten years.

On suit for writ

of error, Held, reversed and remanded.

The record

failed to disclose that he was admonished of the consequences of a plea of guilty to grand larceny.
"This judgment must be reversed, nevertheless,
because the record does not show that the court explained to the plaintiff in error the consequences of
his plea of guilty to the charge of grand larceny.

The

record shows that, when the plea of guilty to the charge
of robbery was entered, the court explained the consequences of that plea, and afterwards accepted the
plea and sentenced the plaintiff in error.

Subsequently
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the sentence was vacated, the plea withdrawn, and the
state's attorney waived the robbery charge.

The

defendant's relation to the case was then the same as
if he had never entered a plea.

The sentence followed

without explanation of the consequences of the plea. The
record, containing no reference to any explanation to
the defendant of the consequences of

h~s

was insufficient to sustain the judgment.

plea of guilty,
People v.

Petrie, 294 Ill. 366, 128 N.E. 569; Krolage v. People,
2 2 4 Ill . 4 56 , 7 9 N • E. 57 0 , 8 Ann . Cas . 2 3 5 . ''

P. 8 64 .

Other Illinois cases are to the same effect.

See

i .. ~. Peoplev. Meyers, 397111.286, 73N.E. 2d288

1947) (Wilson, J.)

(The defendant was sentenced to

from one to fourteen years.

He was charged with two

offenses, one carrying a maximum term of ten years,
the other, of life.

Though the record said that the

defendant was duly admonished, the Supreme Court
found error.

The Court was unwilling to say that the

defendant was duly admonished since the trial court did
not appear to know what the consequences were.
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In

view of the fact that the original conviction had occurred
sixteen years in the past, the Court ordered that the
case be dismissed.

There would be no useful purpose

in ordering a new trial.)

People v. Washington, 5 Ill.

2d 58, 124 N.E. Zd 890 (1955) (Klingbiel, J.) (Though
the common-law record reported that the defendant was
admonished, the transcript showed that the admonishment was unsatisfactory.
reversed.

Therefore, the case was

Note, however, that the admonishment in

that case was more complete than the one given David
Banford.) People v. Cooper, 366 Ill. 113, 7 N.E. 2d
882 (1937) (Wilson, J.) (Reversal of conviction on
plea of guilty to misdemeanor of disorderly conduct
at a primary election. )
2.

The Court of Criminal Appeals 1s the court of

last resort in criminal cases in Texas.

Ann. Tex. Canst. Art. 5 ~~

Vernon's

3 and 5, and interpretative

commentary following each section.

In Texas, the

prosecution must prove a prima facie case on certain
crimes even if the defendant pleads guilty.

Braggs v.
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State, Cr. App. , 334 S. W. 2d 793.

Further, the

accused can't plead guilty to certain crimes unless
he's accompanied by counsel.

Ex parte Kelley, 161

Cr.R. 330, 277 S. W. 2d 111 (1955) (Davidson, J.)
Even so, the requirement that the court must admonish
the defendant of the consequences of his plea before it
may accept a plea of guilty is mandatory.

For two

examples, see Alexander v. State, 163 Cr.R. 53, 288
S. W. 2d 779 ( 1956) (Belcher, Cms r. ) (plea of guilty
to felony of driving while intoxicated) and Coleman v.
State, 35 Cr. R. 404, 33 S. W. 1083 (1896) (Davidson,
J.) sentence of death on plea of guilty to first degree

murder, reversed, even though defendant was already
serving life imprisonment on a plea of guilty to another
first degree murder.) See, also, May v. State, 151
Cr. R. 534, 209S.W. 2d606 (1948)

(reversedon

another point) (" . . . It is to be hoped that the trial
judges will keep in mind the requirements of the
statute in accepting pleas of guilty in felony cases
p. 607) Many other cases are found in the annotation
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II

to Vernon's
3.

Texas C.C.P. Art. 501.

OTHER STATES

Other states having similar statutes have interpreted them as being mandatory if the statutes have
been interpr.eted at all.
New York has the law that a man loses his driver's
license if he has three moving violations in eighteen
months, but that a magistrate need inform a defendant
of this consequence if he desires to plead guilty to a
violation which will count as one of the three.

In

Hubbellv. MacDuff, 2N.Y. 2d563, 141 N.E. 2d897
(1957) Fuld, J. ), the New York court of last resort
held that if the driver was not duly admonished, then
the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles must return his
license.
The Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure #182 is
substantially identical to section 224 of the A.L.I.
Code of Criminal Procedure (1930}.

It therefore

contains the proviso that the failure to admonish is
not jurisdictional.

While State v. Smith 66 Ariz. 376
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189 P. 2d 205 (La Prade, J.) was reversed on other
grounds, the court noted that the requirement to admonish was in the code for a purpose.
So far as counsel's research discloses, only two
other states have similar provisions.

Alaska's Rule

of Criminal Procedure # 11 has not been judicially interpreted.

s
Colorado Rev. Stat. (1953) s 39 -7-8 was

ruled complied with the Glass v. People, 12 7 Colo.
210,255 P. 2d 738 (1953: en bane) (Moore, J.).

The

defendant was duly informed of the consequence of his
plea when the trial judge informed him that he may be
sentenced to life, even though the statute required
that he must be sentenced to life.)
2.

THE DEFENDANT COULD NOT VALIDLY

WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR THE REASON
THAT HE WAS A MINOR AND THEREFORE NOT SUI
JURIS.
A.

The law of Utah and certain other states sup-

ports the conclusion that there is a minimal age below
which a person is not competent to defend himself in a
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criminal case.
There should be a minimal age below which the
court should not allow a youngster to waive his right
to counsel--an age below which a man's ability to
fend for himself is sufficiently in doubt so that a court
will require that the boy have a lawyer.

That age is the

age at which he becomes sui juris.
Utah law seems to assume that such an age exists.
In the case of State v. Penderville, 2 Utah 2d 281, 272
P. 2d 195, the defendant appealed from the Honorable
A. H. Ellett's dramatic ruling that nobody was competent to defend himself when charged with murder, and
that, therefore, the court would appoint a lawyer to
represent him whether he like it or not.

In light of

Article 1, section 12 of the Utah Constitution, which
guarantees the right to defend in person or by coul).sel,
this court ruled that the trial court's conclusive presumption, however valid it was in fact, was not valid in
law.

A man may defend himself, or, at least, may try,

if he is "sui juris and not mentally competent." State
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v. Penderville, 272 P. 2d 195, 199.
Other courts have emphasized the same point.

In

State v. Thomlinson, (South Dakota: 1960) 100 N. W. 2d

121, the court used the phrase, "If he is sui juris and
mentally competent . . . " In Dietz v. State, 149 Wis.
46 2 , 13 6 N • W • 16 6 , Ann . Cas . 1 9 13 C , 7 3 2 ( 1 9 12) , the
court noted the need for the defendant to be sui juris.

In

both of these cases, the defendant was sui juris; in both
cases the defendant was over twenty-one.

B.

The determining age is twenty-one.

The rule requiring counsel for minors appears to
be an old one.

In Regina v. Tanner et alios, 2 Lord

Raymond 1284 (6 Queen Anne) (92 Eng. Reprints 342),
the defendant pleaded not guilty to an information
charing the misdemeanor of riot.
Queen.

Verdict for the

A motion was made to set aside the verdict,

first, because the defendant gave no authority to the
attorney to appear for him; second, because he was an
infant under 18 and ought to have appeared by a guardian.
In denying the motion, the court noted that in cases
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charging infants with riot, the custom of the Queen's
office was to have the defendant appear by an attorney.
Counsel submits that there is something significant in
that custom, occurring as it does in a period when
English courts denied the right to counsel to persons
charged with felonies.
In Kansas, where the point has been litigated; it
1s jurisdictional error to fail to require counsel when
a minor 1s accused of a felony if the minor does not
have his own lawyer.

Quoting from State v. Oberst,

127 Kansas 412, 419, 273 Pac. 490, 494, " . . . In
the case before us the defendant was a seventeen-yearold boy . . . The one thing this youngster needed more
than anything else before pleading guilty to such a·horrifying accusation was consultation with and the advice
of a good lawyer . . . "

Continuing, 127 Kansas at

421, 2 73 Pac. at 494-5, " . . . it is suggested that
there are many prisoners incarcerated in our penal
institutions on pleas of guilty without advice of counsel.
We doubt that, and would be sorry, indeed, if it were
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true, particularly if they are seventeen-year-old lads,
who, without legal advice pleaded guilty to a murder 1n
the first degree.

Certainly, we are not anxious to

share the responsibility for such a lamentable situation.
We are well assured that the common practice in
the district courts of this state is not to accept a plea
of guilty in any felony case, except on the well-considered
advice of counsel for the prisoner, and some careful
judges take other precautions to avoid miscarriage of
justice which need not now be discussed." In Willey v.
Hudspeth, 162 Kansas 516, 178 P. 2d 246 (1947)
(Bartch, J.) the question was whether the trial court
erred in accepting a seventeen-year-old boy's plea of
guilty to burglary in the second degree and to grand
larceny.

Held, the trial court erred, even though the

trial judge duly notified the defendant of his Constitutional rights and that the court would appoint a lawyer
for him if he had none.

The trial court also explained

the nature of the charge and explained the penalty to
the defendant--a procedure not followed when David
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Banford appeared before the trial court in this case.
Quoting from page 248, ". . . in none of the cited
cases and in none which our research has disclosed,
has this court approved the practice of permitting a
17-year-old boy to enter a plea of guilty to a felony
without consulting with counsel . . . "

Further in the

opinion, the court says, "When the petitioner, as a
boy of only 17 years of age, stood before the court,
under the laws of this state he could not have entered
into a valid contract obligating himself; he could not
have voted; he could not have married without the
consent of a parent; he could not alone, without a
guardian ad litem, or next friend, have been heard to
say anything in the court room in a civil action which
would have been binding.

Should we say, in such cir-

cumstances, that about the only thing he could have
done alone, with legal significance, was to have pleaded
guilty to a felony in a court of law?" See also Dunfee
v. Hudspeth, 162 Kan. 524, 178 P. 2d 1009 (1947)
Harvey, C. J. ) {defendant was twenty when he pled
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guilty; he was granted a new trial) and McCarty v.
Hudspeth, 166 Kan. 476, 201, P. 2d 658 (1949) (Thiele,

J.).

See, also, Application of Gillette, (Okl. Cr.) 349

P. 2d 769 (Brett, J.) (fifteen-year-old defendant could
not waive counsel.)
C.

Therefore, David Banford should receive a

new trial.
David Banford is a minor, as 1s shown by the fact
that the court considered sentencing him to reform
school.

Under the above authorities, he could not

waive his right to counsel.

Therefore, he should have

a new trial at which he will have counsel.
3.

THE DEFENDANT COULD NOT VALIDLY

WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR THE REASON
THAT THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO EXPLAIN TO
DEFENDANT THAT HE WAS ENTITLED TO COUNSEL
EVEN THOUGH HE BE A PAUPER.
The 1 egislature, in jts wisdom, has determined
that a man accused of a felony may well be at a disadvantage because he is not acquainted with judicial
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procedure sufficiently well to be able to defend himself
or to evaluate his chances of showing the jury that
there is a reasonable doubt.

While it may be well and

good to convict the guilty, it is equally important that
the innocent have an expert to defend their rights.
Accordingly, the laws of the State of Utah include ~ 7722-12 U.C.A. (1953):
"If the defendant appears for arraignment without
counsel, he must be informed by the court that it ·
is his right to have counsel before being arraigned,
and must be asked whether he desires the aid of
counsel.

If he desires, but is unable to employ, counsel,

the court must assign counsel to defend him." See, also,
77-15-1, ibid.
If a man is sui juris and otherwise competent, he
may waive that right to counsel.
supra.

State v. Penderville,

However, the presumption is against a compe-

tent waiver.

Velky v. United States, 279 F. 2d 679;

Smith v. United States, 238 F. 2d 925 (1956) (5th Cir.:
Hutcheson, J.) See also People v. Kemp, 11 Cal.
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R pt r . 3 6 1 , 3 59 P. 2d 9 13 (S . C t . : en b anc ) (Peters ,

J.: 1961) (Trial judge properly denied the defendant's
request to discharge counsel after ascertaining that,
though the defendant understood the elements of the
offense, he did not under stand judicial procedure
sufficiently well to be competent to handle his own
defense.)
Before the waiver is competent, the defendant
must be aware of the right he waives.

Griffith V.

Wray, 282 F. 2d 711 (applying the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States).
Therefore, the following cases inter alia have
found error in a trial court's accepting a waiver of
counsel because the trial court failed to make the
defendant aware that he was entitled to counsel forma
pauperis .

Ex Parte Cannon, (Okl. Cr. : 196 0} 3 51

P. 2d 756 (Brett, J.) ("A waiver of the constitutional
right to the assistance of counsel is of no less moment
to an accused who must decide whether to plead guilty
than to an accused who stands trial." Court Syllabus
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#2.) State v. Jameson (S.D.: 1958) 91 N. W. 2d 743
(plea of guilty to two c aunts of molesting a minor child.
New trial ordered following petition of habeas corpus.
The trial court had said to the defendant, "You are
in addition advised that you are entitled to be represented by an attorney at all stages of the case if you so
desire***do you understand these rights?" The defendant answered, "I believe I do so, Your Honor.")
(Note that the language in that case is almost identical
to the language David Banford heard in the court below.)
Winn v. State, 232 Ind. 70, 111 N.E. 2d 653 (1953)
(Charge:

Inflicting injury with a dangerous weapon

while in the commission of a robbery) (Court: "do you
have an attorney?" Defendant:
"Do you want one?" Defendant:

"No, Sir. "

Court:

"No, Sir.") (The

court found an unintelligent waiver because the trial
court didn't say that the lawyer would be a public expense
Under the above authorities, David Banford's waiver
was incompetent because the trial judge failed to tell
him that if he could not afford a lawyer the court would
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appoint one.

Therefore, David Banford is entitled to

a new trial.
4.

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ASCERTAIN

WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS IN FACT COMPETENT
TO WAIVE COUNSEL.
As noted in State v. Penderville, supra, the criminally accused may waive counsel if he is sui juris and
otherwise competent.

It follows that the trial court

must not only ascertain whether the accused is sui
juris but also whether he is mentally competent, before the court may allow the defendant to waive his
right to counsel.
Under the presumption against waiver of a constitutional right to counsel,

see~·.&·

People v. Whitsitt,

359 Mich. 656, 103 N. W. 2d 424 {1960) {Black, J.)
and the Supreme Court decisions cited therein, a
defendant can be found to have competently waived
counsel only if the trial court makes a finding that the
defendant is mentally competent to exercise the waiver.
As implied in State v. Penderville, supra, and as held
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in People v. Kemp, supra, if the defendant is found to
be incompetent to handle his own case, then the court
must appoint a lawyer to defend him.

(In this regard,

see also the annotation to Vernon's Texas C. C. P. Art.

501.)
Admittedly, the above cases do not specifically
state that the presumption against waiver necessitates
a finding of fact that the defendant is competent to
waive counsel before the trial court allows the waiver.
Counsel submit for the consideration of this court
that, since there is a presumption against competent
waiver, it necessarily follows that this presumption
is stronger than a presumption of proper exercise of
judicial discretion if both presumptions are forced to
rely upon a silent record.

If the presumption that the

trial court exercised its discretion is applied, then the
presumption against a competent waiver becomes nonexistent.

This is because the proof of a competent

waiver will then necessarily be forced to rely upon
some actual testimony or evidence.

Since there is a
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presumption against competent waiver, the appellant
David Banford must necessarily be granted the benefit
of that presumption.

It therefore becomes necessary

for the trial record to show some testimony or some
questioning to rebut that presumption.

Since the record

fails to show any such testimony or questioning, it
follows that the presumption is not rebutted.

Therefore,

the trial court erred in accepting the purported waiver.
5.

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO REQUIRE

THAT DAVID BANFORD DISCUSS THE CASE WITH A
LAWYER BEFORE HE WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEl
Because a defendant does not know law, he needs
the advice of someone who does.

Only then can he

understand exactly what his situation is.

A judge

cannot fulfill that role--anything the defendant says
in open court can be held against him.

The defendant

can trust only a person who is bound to keep the communication secret.

Only a lawyer has the needed

education plus the needed privilege.
Once a defendant talks to a lawyer, he is aware
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of what his problems and chances are.

Only then can

he make waivers with an appreciation of what he is
waiving.
Appreciating this, some courts have noted the
advisability of requiring that a defendant discuss his
case with a lawyer.

See i.e. State v. Thomlinson

(S.D. ) 1 0 0 N. W. 2d 121 .
Some district judges 1n Utah require than an
accused see a lawyer before he may plead or waive
rights.

Counsel understand that both the Honorable

A. H. Ellett and the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson
have such a ru1e.

Counsel has heard that the rule is

applied in almost all felony cases before the Third
Judicial District.

The rule is also the standard pro-

cedure in the trial courts of Kansas.

Dunfee v.

Hudspeth, supra, esp. the quotation from that case,
supra. Such a plan appears to be successful.
Because the rule is successful, and because the
rule is reasonable in light of the established laws of
due process, this court should rule that, in the absence
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of a legislative enactment to the contrary, it appears
that no defendant may waive his rights or plead guilty
to a felony until the court has required that he see a
lawyer.
Such a r.ule fulfills the traditional concept of the
development of common law- -that for each evil,
there must be a remedy.

While a legislature chooses

the problems it desires to face, and resolves the
questions which it desires to resolve, a court faces
only the questions brought before it and it must resolve
these questions.

This difference in function as pere-

nially required that courts develop law on a case-bycase basis.

The judges determine that which appears

reasonable.

In the absence of a legislative deter-

mination to the contrary, that judicial opinion becomes
the law.

Thereby, the people gain a remedy for each

evil.
A judge, in establishing a rule, looks to the
nature of people and the nature of the world in which
we live.

An excellent application of this type of
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reasoning is found in Justice Tom Clark's opinion
in Mapp v. Ohio,-- U.S.--, 81 S. Ct. 1684.

The

Court was concerned with the question of whether
illegally obtained evidence may support a conviction
in a state court.

Justice Clark analyzed the consi-

derations on both sides and viewed the question of
whether the federal exclusion rule had worked
satisfactorily.

Concluding that the value of the rule

was great, and that it worked no undue hardship on
federal enforcement agencies, he ruled for the Court
that the exclusion rule was the law under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The same style of reasoning applies here.

A

number of trial courts in Utah require that a defendant talk to a lawyer before the defendant may waive
counsel or plead.

Apparently, many other trial

judges throughout the land apply the same rule.
The rule has worked no undue hardships.

The value

of the rule is that the young, the unintelligent, and
the hang-dog defendants gain counselling from
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trained advocates on their side.

Since many people

are not as mature, knowing, and sophisticated as one
would wish, the rule has been a great aid to many
people.

Counsel submits that it should be a great aid

to all.
CONCLUSION
David Banford was not granted those rights which
are guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and guaranteed by the
Constitution and laws of the State of Utah.

Therefore,

the trial court lost jurisdiction over the process.

It

follows that David Banford is entitled to a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

Richard G. Daly
Richard S. Shepherd
Attorneys for Appellant
1876 South Main Street
Salt Lake City~ Utah
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